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Abstract 
This study examines the implementation of Traditional Landholding Certificates in the 
Petauke District, and how providing access for small-scale farmers to secure land is affected 
by the power structures on customary land. Nine weeks were spent collecting data in the 
Petauke District through quantitative and qualitative interviews with stakeholders and 
farmers. The empirical material showed a higher perception of security and relatively equal 
distribution in the model villages, where the creators had aimed to implement the certificates 
in every household. However, it also showed indicators that the existing power relations on 
customary land allow chiefs to benefit by the Traditional Landholding Certificates on behalf 
of farmers that not yet have obtained them, which highlight the potential worsening of social 
differentiation. The implementation of the certificates has occurred from the Zambian 
National Decentralisation Plan’s aim to increase the participation of chiefs in governance, and 
the World Bank’s encouragement to build equitable land rights on already existing systems. 
This paper calls for a closer look at the existing power structures, which have to be 
emphasised when it comes to the idealistic image of decentralisation bringing power closer to 
the grassroots. I would like to emphasise the risk of an unequal opportunity for negotiation 
among the farmers, and the risk of the chiefs being political and becoming economic actors 
putting their own interests first, rather than the benefit of the farmers. The Traditional 
Landholding Certificates are built upon an administrative system that contains power 
structures where the elite control access to resources, and hence – the vulnerable social groups 
that often lack access to secure land may, in fact, still lose out in the implementation of the 
certificates.   
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1. Introduction 
“After the demise of my father, his brother chased my five siblings and me from five 
hectares of land, He told us that our father’s land was his and not ours” 
The Case of Mary, Zambia
1
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Traditional Landholding Certificates were introduced by Petauke District Land Alliance in 
2010 as a new system to make land secure for all small-scale farmers. The alliance itself was 
created three years earlier as a reaction to a survey showing that Petauke District was extra 
prone to increasing disputes over land in the Eastern Province of Zambia, and has since then 
worked to develop a new system in order to decrease the disputes
2
. The idea is that headman 
and chief - the authorities on customary land – would allow the farmers to cultivate their piece 
of land, where they could use the document as proof. Hence, conflicts arising from unclear 
ownership will be reduced, as many claims to the same piece of land are based upon different 
interpretations of the often contradictory customary norms.  
The implementation of the certificates can be seen in light of the what is called “New 
Evolutionary Property Rights”, which is suggested by the World Bank to build land reform on 
already existing systems for a more pro-poor, efficient and adaptive outcome through 
negotiability on a local level
3
. The Zambian National Decentralisation Plan is aiming to bring 
the people closer to the government by decentralising power down to a local level, increasing 
the participation of chiefs in governance in order to trickle down development to the 
grassroots level
4
. It is within this context that the implementation of the Traditional 
Landholding Certificates came to be, with international and national encouragement of civil 
society to negotiate a new system which can benefit the poor while remaining the structure of 
traditional land. However, this approach barely takes into account the power structures on 
customary land and the potential impact those structures have on the conflicts through the 
dimensions of inclusion and exclusion of access to productive resources like land. Given that 
the certificates are based upon the existing structure of customary land, I call for a closer 
                                                          
1
 We Effect (2013). “Study on the Land Rights of Women in Southern Africa” 
2
 Interview with Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February 
3
 Peters, Pauline (2004). “Inequality and Social Conflict Over Land in Africa” 
4
 Lusaka Times “Government approves the Decentralisation Policy”; AllAfrica “Zambia: New Decentralisation 
Policy Empowers Chiefs – Sata” 
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historical and empirical look at the power structure’s impact on social differentiation – of 
whether remaining within the new system of Traditional Landholding Certificates has a 
potential to affect the success of equal security to land among small-scale farmers.  
1.2 Increasing Value of Land 
With approximately 60% of the total population living in rural areas, the dependence of 
agricultural production remains crucial for survival for a big part of the population
5
. Though 
the Zambian economy lately has experienced high growth rates due to rising world demand 
for copper, the inequality within the country is increasing, with a major difference being seen 
between the urban versus the rural areas
6
. With the majority of rural people depending on 
subsistence agriculture and poorly rewarding off-farm incomes as sources of livelihoods, the 
importance of land for the poor needs to be taken seriously
7
. Land in Zambia is considered 
relatively abundant, as in most of Africa. The population is increasing rapidly however, with 
2,8% per year between 2000 and 2010, and although urbanisation continues rapidly, the 
population growth in the urban as well as the rural areas forces people to look for new land – 
either for farming purposes or in order to live outside and commute into town
8
. Increasing 
pressure and value of land affects the customary land more than the state land because of the 
fact that state land is considerably more expensive while all Zambian’s have the right to 
obtain customary land. According to Chileshe, the proportion of land in the villages that are 
communally held has been reduced while family-held land has risen. He concludes that “it is 
clear that customary land available per household by province is becoming scarce and even 
critical in provinces such as Eastern”9. Zambia has a dual land tenure system influenced by 
the British colonial policies, where the more fertile land, approximately 6%, were cultivated 
by the colonisers under state law, whereas the remaining 94% were cultivated by indigenous 
farmers under customary law based upon the traditional norms depending of chiefdom. The 
duality remains through present day, with laws separating the individuals on state land from 
the farmers on customary land. However, the laws on customary land are different depending 
on ethnic tribe, where the individual farmers are defined as members of the tribe and their 
access to land highly linked to that membership and the negotiable laws posed upon them. 
                                                          
5
 Zambia Central Statistical Office (2012); We Effect (2013) “Study on the Land Rights of Women in Southern 
Africa” 
6
 Gapminder (2013) 
7
 Chileshe (2005). ”Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia” 
8
 Zambia Central Statistical Office (2012); Peters (2004). “Inequality and Social Conflict Over Land in Africa” 
9
 Chileshe (2005). ”Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia” p. 4 
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The rising demand is making the value of land in Zambia increase, and trends show that 
unequal access to land spurs the conflicts and competitions, likely to intensify social 
differentiation. 
1.3 Global Agenda and National Decentralisation Policy 
In the end of the 1980s, the World Bank started to emphasise existing traditional systems, 
arguing that their flexible character made them more adaptive to changes than state-led 
intervention. This shift in agenda is strongly associated with past failures to improve 
agricultural development and economic growth. In the end of the colonial era, prejudices 
against customary land tenure included the lack of security and clearly defined property 
rights, which were seen as reducing incentives to invest in the land. In order to modernise 
agriculture, land policy reforms included a replacement of customary land tenure systems in 
many African countries with land titling systems in the 60s and 70s. The 80s did however 
show a failure to achieve the expected results of development. Land titling programmes had 
neither led to increased growth within the agricultural sector nor safeguarded the customary 
rights of the rural communities, but instead concentrated land in the hands of the elites
10
. For 
farmers that had depended on customary land rights, statutory land titling had in some cases 
even resulted in landlessness and increased poverty
11
. World Bank experts on land, when 
forced to rethink, instead suggested building on already existing systems, and introduced the 
new framework referred to as the “New Evolutionary Property Rights”, which emphasise 
secure land rights but with local negotiations to result in more equitable land right outcomes, 
and urge for caution about state-led intervention. Zambia, highly influenced by the agenda of 
the World Bank, has implemented a decentralisation plan, where rationales for 
decentralisation include: improved transparency and accountability, reduction in power of the 
central government, and most importantly for my research question; greater equity and 
effectiveness in the allocation of resources. The government aims to facilitate the 
decentralisation of land administration and process of management, and refer to land when 
writing that “The restructuring and strengthening of the Ministry will aim to make it more 
effective, professional and transparent so as to secure fair and equitable access to, and control 
of this vital resource”12. The sixth national development plan goes on to say that “the National 
Decentralization Policy seeks to improve the functioning of the local government system by 
                                                          
10
 Chileshe (2005). ”Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia” 
11
 Platteau (2000). ”Land tenure, economic growth and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa” 
12
 “Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010” Republic of Zambia, p.57 
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increasing responsibilities of the local authorities through devolution [independent authority] 
of power with matching resources and embodying democratic principles”13. They highlight 
that the most fundamental reason is that the government and the people are brought closer 
together.   
1.4 Aim and Justification of Research 
The above discussion is assuming that decentralisation, where chiefs will participate more in 
local governance, will lead to equitable outcomes of development through negotiability. 
However, I would like to emphasise the risk of unequal negotiability powers among the 
farmers, and the risk of the chiefs being political and economic actors with own interests 
rather than the benefit of the farmers. The Traditional Landholding Certificates are built upon 
an administrative system which contains power structures where the elites control the access 
to resources. Many studies show how vulnerable groups like women and children lose in the 
conflicts over land, which hence calls for a closer look at the relationship between the power 
structure on customary land and farmers’ access to secure land14.  
The aim of my study is to get a deeper understanding of how the system of Traditional 
landholding certificates works. By looking at the relationship between power structures and 
access to economic resources, in this case land, I wish to investigate whether or not the 
certificates have an impact on inequality and social differentiation, and who wins and who 
loses when it comes to the implementation of the certificates. 
This study is based on theory as well as on the field study that was carried out in Petauke 
District, Eastern Province in Zambia during nine weeks in the beginning of 2014. 
Theoretically, it builds on the discussion of power relations, chieftaincy, and unequal access 
to land on the specific administrative system of customary land influenced by the writings of 
Mahmood Mamdani and Pauline Peters. Empirically, it builds on the analysis of the 
quantitative and qualitative data gathered from small-scale farmers, PDLA and other 
stakeholders in Petauke District regarding the Traditional Landholding Certificates.   
 
 
                                                          
13
 “Sixth National Development Plan 2011-2015” Republic of Zambia, p.168 
14
 We Effect (2013) “Study on the Land Rights of Women in Southern Africa” 
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1.5 Research Question 
What impact does the power structure of customary land have on social differentiation under 
the implementation of Traditional Landholding Certificates? 
 Is the access to the Traditional Landholding Certificates equally distributed among 
farmers or do social groupings affect the access?  
 How does the implementation of Traditional Landholding Certificates affect the 
security to land? 
 How does the role do the chiefs affect an equitable implementation?  
 
2. Background 
The Traditional Landholding Certificates (TLHC) were created in order to solve the 
increasing conflicts over land in Petauke District, and empower the vulnerable social groups 
that, in conflicts, are more prone to lose the land which their livelihood depend. To understand 
how the TLHC are intended to work we have to look at the reason for the implementation 
based on the unequal access to land and security to keep the land through customary tenure. 
As the TLHC is also building on the administrative system of customary land tenure, we first 
need to look at how the customary system works, the conflicts, and how the TLHC aim to 
solve them according to the creators at Petauke District Land Alliance (PDLA). 
2.1 The Customary Land Tenure System 
“Zambia has 72 tribes that since immemorial have lived on customary lands in customary 
ways, so what defines a tribe is land”15. 
The republican constitution of Zambia states that all customary land should lawfully be 
alienated to a specific community by any process of law, hence the management and 
administration are different depending on tribe and chiefdom
16
. Each chiefdom consists of a 
number of villages, each village having a headman – their roles inherited just as the chiefs’ – 
who is the land administrator in the village. Customary land, when used for subsistence 
farming, was held by the community rather than the individual, with individual rights 
subordinate to the community ones. This facilitated periodical redistribution among family 
members and prevented a class of individuals that were permanently landless to ascend. With 
                                                          
15
 Interview with Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10
th
 of February 
16
 The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 
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population increase, however, a system of communal property rights emerged with the 
members of the tribe obtaining the right to cultivate
17
. Though the procedure for acquiring 
customary land differs, the general practice involves an interview by the local headman who 
allocates the land. If the applicant of the land originally comes from another chiefdom then a 
letter from that chief introducing and describing the applicant is required
18
. The main debate 
regarding inequality on customary land focuses on highly unequal access depending on social 
identity as well as security to the land
19
. A lot of the conflicts over land are situated within 
family land, which is held by the family and under the control of the family head. In this sense 
customary land is owned by the community, but each piece of family land works as 
individually controlled by the family. Approximately 99% of the customary land is family 
land, and most land that is given to grown up children (and their spouses) are pieces of the 
family land which hence becomes divided into smaller and smaller plots. To understand the 
context in which many of these conflicts arise, it is important to look at the inheritance system 
and the fact that every person belongs to a specific village. In Zambia, you belong to the 
village where you have your ancestral roots. Even the people living in the cities have their 
roots in a village somewhere, and the land that they belong to is the land that their parents 
come from - where their families belong
20
. That the people are defined as belonging to a 
certain village in relation to the either matrilineal or patrilineal inheritance system can create 
issues for women and children especially. Generally, Zambia is matrilineal, in which the 
matrilineal extended family is seen as higher than the household. Chileshe expresses in clear 
sentences; 
”In many cases, women living in their husband’s village lose land rights upon the death of 
a husband. The matrilineal relatives of the late husband will often claim most of the 
valuable household assets including crop fields. This practice is based on the belief that a 
wife comes to her husband’s village ‘empty handed’ and that her place is in her mother’s 
village. However even when women relocate to the maternal village their access, control 
and ownership of land is also uncertain and is dominated by male relatives” 21. 
 
                                                          
17
 Petauke District Land Alliance (2012). “Customary Land Administration Guidelines” 
18
 Swedish Cooperative Centre  and Zambia Land Alliance (2012). “Lets talk about Land: Study Circle Material” 
19
 Chileshe (2005). ”Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia”; Deininger (2004).”Land Policies and Land 
Reform” World Bank 
20 Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 13th of March 
21
 Chileshe (2005) ”Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia” p. 133 
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The spouses that left their village after marriage and hence are an extra vulnerable social 
group when it comes to inheritance disputes will for the remainder of this paper be referred to 
as strangers, as they are according to traditional customs belonging to another village. Much 
criticism towards customary land is based upon these disadvantages women, children, and 
strangers face, and it is hence not the access to land, but rather the secure rights to the land 
obtained that is the major problem creating disputes. Apart from inheritance disputes, 
boundary disputes due to the lack of demarcation, trespass disputes, and encroachment 
disputes are common, as well as conflicts between as well as within chiefdoms. In a study 
circle material provided by the Zambian Land Alliance and Swedish Cooperative Centre it is 
argued that these land disputes arise when the subjects are victims of poor land 
administration, where both corruption and frustration can spur conflicts
22
. To add to the 
severity, the belief in witchcraft affects the conflicts, and the threat of being bewitched can be 
enough for people to leave their land. As a pastor I spoke to put it; 
“People fight. And the problem with Africans is that if you continue to persist a fight, 
someone is going to bewitch you. And that is bad. You understand what I’m saying? But 
what we, as Christian believers of God, we don’t believe in those! But that is what happens 
to those who are not Christians, they do that. And you can die for sure”23. 
Because the norms that the customary law follows are not written down, but are instead 
accepted in respect to the dressing, marriage, burial, and any other beliefs by the tribe, the 
dispute resolutions become complex. This has opened up room for misinterpretations and 
misapplications of the norms which can be contradictory and open for negotiation. The 
traditional leaders have the right to reallocate people from their land without consulting the 
people cultivating it and settle these disputes
24
. 
It is argued that the main advantage with state land is that it is the most secure way of holding 
land as it is clearly defined and registered on title deeds. The security is also enough for the 
banks to accept the deed as collateral when the owner seeks to obtain a loan
25
. The land policy 
after independence was built on socialism and humanism, and apart from deciding that all 
land should be vested in the president and hence centralizing the policies, was also against the 
conversion of customary land into leasehold. The land policy was however revisited when the 
                                                          
22
 Swedish Cooperative Centre  and Zambia Land Alliance (2012). “Lets talk about Land: Study Circle Material”  
23 Interview with Pastor Shamwanga, Petauke, 11th of February 2014 
24
 Petauke District Land Alliance (2012). “Customary Land Administration Guidelines” 
25
 Swedish Cooperative Centre  and Zambia Land Alliance (2012). “Lets talk about Land: Study Circle Material”  
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movement for multi-party democracy (MMD) formed government in 1991 with a more 
liberalized economy in focus
26
. The Lands Act No. 29 of 1995 clearly states that 
“[A]ny person who holds land under customary tenure may convert it into a leasehold 
tenure not exceeding ninety-nine years on application” and “The conversion of rights from 
a customary tenure to a leasehold tenure shall have effect only after the approval of the 
chief and the local authorities in whose area the land to be converted is situated” 27.   
Among the problems with leasehold, however, is the cost of surveying the land, which is too 
expensive for the majority of small-scale farmers to afford
28
. Therefore, the present 
government (president Sata’s party the Patriotic Front) is aiming to strengthen customary land 
and is focused on the poor, and is demonstrating its ability to support the demands on the 
implementation of the decentralization policy through systems like the traditional landholding 
certificate
29
. 
2.2 Traditional Landholding Certificates 
The PDLA is one out of seven district alliances under Zambia Land Alliance, a network of 
NGOs that collectively promote equitable access to secure land by advocating and lobbying 
for fair laws and land
30
. The PDLA want to make sure that whatever they do with the 
implementation of TLHC is within the confines of the law, and emphasize the current 
decentralization policy and village registration and development act
31
. The certificates are 
built upon the traditional norms of customary land tenure in Petauke District to give security 
on customary land. PDLA argue that they do not promote conversion into leasehold, as 
“[O]nce land is converted, it doesn’t go back to the chief, which means that all that has got 
to do with the chieftaincy, will also go. And we will not allow our traditions and customs to 
go. So in a way we need to preserve that and the only way is to make sure that the land 
within customary remains there” 32. 
                                                          
26
 Sichone (2008), “Land Administration in Zambia with particular reference to customary Land” 
27
 The Lands Act No. 29 of 1995, 20 of 1996, Chapter 184, p.9 
28
 Chileshe (2005) ”Land Tenure and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia” p. 186 
29
 Commissioner of Lands, Chief workshop 25th of February 2014, Petauke 
30
 Zambia Land Alliance website 2014-04-10 
31
 Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, Chief workshop 25th of February, Petauke 
32 Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February 
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The certificates are hence a form of title on customary land, not used for speculation but still 
providing farmers with security to their land which can – as soon as the banks accept - also be 
used as collateral to allow the farmers to get loans to increase their productivity. As PDLA 
wants the certificates to benefit the small-scale farmers, they want the application and access 
to certificate as fast and cheap as possible (title deeds that have been severely criticized for 
being expensive and difficult to obtain without a comprehensive document, excluding many 
disadvantaged farmers). 
Petauke District is a farming community with an estimated 90% of the population of 350 000 
involved in farming activities with an average farm size of 5 acres that is shrinking with 
population increase and a rising value of land
33
. From a survey done by the umbrella 
organisation Zambia Land Alliance it was discovered that Petauke District had more 
inheritance and boundary disputes than any other place. Arguing that it is ownership that is 
the cause of these disputes, PDLA came up with a document where the chief and headmen 
have to commit themselves that they have given the land to you and therefore cannot misuse 
their power
34
. The certificate is based upon the Customary Land Administration Guidelines 
that PDLA produced after collecting and documenting the norms on customary land in 
agreement with the chiefs
35
.  
There are two different application forms (see appendix) for farmers that wish to obtain a 
certificate; one for people already cultivating a piece of land, and another for people who 
apply for a completely new plot to cultivate
36
. In both applications, the procedure goes as 
follows; 
1. The farmer have to obtain double application forms from the chief’s palace 
2. Both forms have to be filled in with one passport size photo attached to each copy 
3. Return the forms to the chief’s palace. 
The chiefs that issue certificates must have formed a Land Allocation Board (LAB) which has 
to approve the application before it is signed by the applicant, local headman, and chief. The 
LAB is a committee that enforces who should allocate land by law. The role of the LAB is to 
advise chiefs in all matters of land administration, establish a land fund, control the allocation 
and cancellation of the certificates by chiefs and headmen, decide on application for rights of 
                                                          
33 Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February 
34 Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February 
35 Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 12th of February 
36
 Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February 
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leasehold, create and maintain registers, and perform any duties that the chief assign. The 
members of the LAB are meant to consist of representatives from the Traditional Authority, 
NGOs, the ministry, organized farming groups, and women representatives
37
. 
In the application form, no expensive surveying of the land is needed but instead the 
boundaries have to be agreed upon by a minimum of four neighbouring farmers. With the 
agreement registered in the land register, only an approximate size is established in order for 
the chief to know how much land that is vested in the certificate
38
. Just as the certificates are 
to solve boundary disputes, they also include an important section to solve inheritance 
disputes; the statement of dependants to take over the land in a case of a death of the 
certificate holder. With the spouse being the first to inherit, women, children and strangers 
will be empowered as the land cannot be grabbed from them by the family members of the 
deceased in the unfortunate cases of death of the applicants. The certificate will therefore be 
transferred to the spouse and children with a lifelong security if agreed in the application
39
. 
The holder of the certificate can also chose to surrender it to change ownership, and as PDLA 
put it; 
“Now they have let it to say that “now I can’t be pushed by the headperson because if the 
headperson is to push me out he must have authority from the chiefs”, alright? What it is 
now is that the headperson who cannot make it any reaction to chase this person because 
they have to change the ownership of the person, but how do they do it? That person must 
surrender the certificate, and if he doesn’t then he still owns that area” 40. 
When a TLHC is obtained, the sense of security and access to loans may lead to 
improvements being made on the land. In case of a transfer, a compensation for the 
improvements can be conditioned by the chief for the new landholder to give to the old 
landholder. As no person has a claim against the chief, traditional leader or the state for the 
improvements, no new owner has the right to take away or destroy the improvements. The 
chief, however, can in consultation with the headperson agree to remove it.  
 
                                                          
37
 Petauke District Land Alliance (2012). “Customary Land Admiistration Guidelines” 
38 Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February; Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land 
Alliance, 13
th
 of March 
39 Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10th of February; Petauke District Land Alliance (2012). 
“Customary Land Administration Guidelines” 
40
 Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 13th of March 
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The chief also has the right to revoke the given certificate on certain conditions such as; 
1. If it is issued in error 
2. If the land is being rented out or sold 
3. If the holder of the certificate applies for consent to convert to leasehold 
4. If holder does not respect the restriction of the certificate 
5. If the land has not been used for three years or is used for wrong purposes41. 
 
The chiefs are also allowed to claim a minimal fee in the form of money or goods for the 
allocation and production cost of the certificate – “bearing in mind that the fee does not 
disadvantage the underprivileged”. The fees agreed by the six chiefs in Petauke District and 
PDLA related to small-scale farming is 500 kwacha for high cost-peri-urban areas and farm 
lands bigger than 5 hectares, and 50 kwacha for village fields less than 5 hectares
42
. 
2.3 The role of the chiefs 
The TLHC were introduced in order to solve these defects on a local level, so that farmers can 
obtain security to their land without converting their land to leasehold tenure which is too 
expensive for the majority of farmers to obtain and also allows the traditions to slip away. 
Solving the conflicts on a local level does however assume that the local mechanisms will 
manage the system smoothly and correctly through the local power structures instead of on a 
state-village level. The local power structure does however contain struggles and conflicts that 
cannot be neglected in new implementations. Chiefs have previously given out other 
documents to elites rather than all farmers, also accepted royalties as fees for purchasing land 
when allocating, as well as speculation in land where land that could have been obtained for 
the price of a chicken has been sold by headmen for as much as 3000 kwacha (~USD430)
43
. 
This presents potential conflicts with a successful implementation of the TLHC, with the 
remaining power structure having a possible impact on the access and security to land that 
may not disappear with the new system. I will in the next chapter introduce two different 
approaches in which the power structures on customary land related to increased social 
differentiation can be understood. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
There is growing evidence that conflicts are increasing in big parts of Africa while rifts 
between - as well as within - social groups are deepening. The narrowing of belonging and 
increased exclusion, in combination with population growth creates tensions that reveal social 
differentiation, and research on conflicts over land and its resources emphasises the roles of 
the elites
44
. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I wish to draw attention to the power 
structure on customary land in relation to social differentiation as understood by Mahmood 
Mamdani and Pauline Peters
45
. Without an aim to test their theories on the implementation of 
the Traditional Landholding Certificates, they have merely been used as a theoretical 
framework for my study.   
Mahmood Mamdani discusses in his book Citizens and Subjects how the role of the chiefs 
were strengthened under British colonial rule, going as far as referring to the chiefs as despots 
with absolute power. Though generalising all chiefs as despots is a radical statement, what I 
take with me as a foundation of this paper is that the chiefs remain strong economic and 
political actors until today. Peters argues that customary land tenure and law was formed in 
order to promote the interests of Europe and the state in the colonies in Africa, in which 
traditional leaders were created unless they could not already be identified
46
. The roles of the 
chiefs had been ritual and territorial before the colonisers arrived, but were misinterpreted as 
being political and sovereign, in which authority over others was exerted. Mamdani’s 
perspective of the administrative system of chiefs are based on the same notion which argues 
that indirect rule increased the powers of the chiefs for the interest of the colonial powers, 
though it has to be noted that the authorities in many cases also had to stay accountable to the 
farmers over which he/she ruled. Earlier experience from e.g. the British colonisation of India 
led the British especially to change focus from what Mamdani defines as a “civilising 
mission” to a “law-and-order obsession”47. The British strategies to control the diversified 
indigenous did not only result in the strengthening of the chiefs to reduce the expensive costs 
of governing vast areas of land and people, but also provoked struggles over access to 
resources. In their search for control, colonial officials gathered often contradictory local laws 
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in order to unify the heterogeneous population into more easily controllable tribes. As Sara 
Berry puts it;   
“Whichever version of customary rights and practices an official chose to believe, people 
were sure to challenge it – both because the past was in fact complex and changing, and 
because Africans took advantage of officials’ interest in tradition to offer evidence 
favourable to their own interests” 48.  
The access to resources hence became a struggle between social groups in which negotiation 
skills could shape the way tradition was written, and how authority and control over land and 
people could be claimed
49
.  
European rule in Africa had a strong emphasis on the customary, developing a customary law 
that came to include not just personal law – like in India – but also land as a communal and 
customary possession. The dual law system created a dichotomy between what Mamdani 
refers to as the citizens and the subjects - the colonisers and the indigenous farmers. The 
citizens were ruled under modern laws based on individual rights, whereas subjects were 
ruled according to different customary laws - defined as members of different tribes rather 
than individuals within the society. The chiefs’ increased power came to include passing rules 
on subjects, executing laws and settle disputes – and hence judicial, executive, legislative and 
administrative authority were all given to one single individual; the chief
50
. At the same time 
as land became a possession of the customary, the sense of belonging can been seen as 
shifting from someone belonging to the land - to the land belonging to someone. Thereby also 
the shift from inclusion to exclusion
51
. Also, with land being a customary possession, the 
productive activity could only partly be affected by market forces, and the use of force by the 
traditional authorities became necessary for the colonial powers to control productivity 
without letting the land be governed by the market. Chiefs became in charge of extracting 
products as well as labour from farmers by force, while also extract personal tribute as a 
source of revenue apart from the salaries earned from the state. Again, indirect rule worked by 
preventing the dissolution of society through containerization of the subject population under 
tribal authorities with autonomous powers once appointed by the colonisers. This is what 
Mamdani refers to as decentralised despotism. The chiefs and the subjects that Mamdani 
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describe highlight strongly the power relations between them, with the chiefs benefiting from 
the system as they have control over the distribution of resources. Influenced by Mamdani, I 
chose to emphasise the containerisation of the farmers as a subordinate group under the chiefs 
by referring to them as subjects in this paper. However, Mamdani treats the subjects as a 
homogenous group, while in fact social differentiation within the subjects can be seen through 
the increasing conflicts where some social groups benefit while others do not
52
.  
Pauline Peters stresses the class differences on customary land, arguing that the subjects are 
far from a homogenous group
53
. These conflicts over land reveal social differentiation in 
access to secure land rights, and Peters argues that these conflicts derive from the specific 
social and political land relations that exist on customary land in Africa in which inequality of 
class must be considered. She shows the heterogeneity among the subjects by emphasising 
different social groups that exist, where struggle between them are linked in the dynamics of 
exclusion and inclusion to the access of productive resources. Peters highlights the struggle 
between genders, generations and ethnicities, in which both gender and age are highly linked 
to the issue of matrilineal inheritance especially mentioned in the previous chapter. Much 
literature emphasises the marginalisation of women when it comes to access to secure land. 
As mentioned earlier, the traditional laws were more or less established during the colonial 
era through negotiations where less vulnerable groups, like men, had a stronger voice to 
define norms that continued to deny women rights to land up until today. Married women in 
Zambia do in general have access to land through their husbands, also often needing 
permission to cultivate the land. If not married, the matrilineal inheritance system mentioned 
in the previous chapter keep the women dependent on their male relatives for access. Whether 
the woman marries into a matrilineal or patrilineal system, the rights to land differ, but though 
matrilineal systems can allocate land to women, which patrilineal do not, in both cases it is 
often controlled by the husbands or male relatives. Also, empirical research has shown that 
land allocated to women continue to be claimed by spouses or male relatives
54
. As children in 
matrilineal societies belong to their mother and hence mother’s relatives, they as well are 
deeply affected by inheritance conflicts, with little power to claim their own rights to the land 
against their fathers’ relatives. When it comes to ethnicity, Peters brings up writers like 
Buijtenhuijs that argue that ethnic wars like what happened in Rwanda was as much based on 
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conflicts over land as between ethnicities
55
. In pre-colonial Africa, strangers – often in forms 
of spouses – were welcome and came with increased status, but Mamdani argues that tensions 
between ethnicities increased are linked to the fact that access to land became confined to the 
members of the tribe
56
. The important dimension that is missing when ethnicity has been 
discussed by Mamdani and Peters is the social bonds that are created by marriage between not 
only different ethnicities – but also between different villages. This can be highly linked to the 
inheritance systems, in which spouses that have married into a stranger village have little 
claim to the land in the case of death of the landholder, but instead are told that they should go 
back to their own village. The access to secure land is hence highly dependent on inclusion or 
exclusion of different social groups - where women, young, and strangers are especially 
vulnerable.  
The post-modern thinking that customary systems are negotiable and adaptive forms of 
landholding and hence an open field of discussions between tribes, communities, civil society, 
national, regional and local groups would lead to an equitable outcome is argued by Peters to 
be idealistic, as certain social groups have limited or no negotiation power. It is within this 
context that the important need to look at how the TLHC functions in relation to the power 
structures over land is made abundantly clear. The PDLA have introduced the certificates in 
order to reduce the conflicts over land and provide secure land rights for everyone, but are 
building the certificates on the existing power structure on customary land to provide an 
alternative to title deeds. The new evolutionary property rights approach that Peters talks 
about is based on various actors negotiating their own solutions in order to secure access to 
land. Ideally, decentralization would allow the society to play a greater role in the 
administration of land, and negotiability on customary land would allow adaptable and equal 
outcomes. The danger, however, is that what is likely to happen looks quite different from the 
post-modern idealisation when put in context of how the existing power structures over land 
in many cases serve the interests of the ruling class. Social differentiation when it comes to 
land relations cannot be neglected, and the risk of national and local elites to capture the 
benefits of decentralisation which are supposed to benefit the poor remains
57
.  
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4. Methodology and data  
The design used for my research is that of a case-study, looking at the case of the area where 
the Traditional Landholding Certificates (TLHC) has been implemented in Petauke District. 
Though I am basing much of my data on interviews with farmers in two different villages, 
there is no comparison between them. Instead, the case is the TLHC – interesting in itself – 
where I have aimed to get an in-depth understanding of the potential impact on social 
differentiation. 
4.1 My role as a Researcher 
First I would like to emphasise that I am aware that my methods used, my questions, and my 
choice of theory are chosen according to my own beliefs. I believe that the main common 
denominators behind political actors like chiefs and traditional authorities, as well as 
governments, are economics and power; hence decentralising power to few individuals closer 
to the civil society will not necessarily result in the benefit of the marginalised without a 
voice. As I (as a researcher) influence the research, while the research setting influences me, 
there is a need to discuss my role - especially since it was the first time I visited Zambia, and 
the first time I carried out formal research.  
Jarvie, discussing the intellectual rather than practical reasons for anthropologists to do 
fieldwork, emphasises the important idea of fieldwork being necessary for the reason of 
understanding the context of the research subject
58
. Though the oddities may still exist after 
reduced bias and a better understanding of the surroundings, being present in the area of 
interest will save you from making obvious errors, while mapping of the society should be 
made before selecting the research topic and issues. The increased knowledge I generated in 
the field affected the way I actively constructed and changed my methodology and research 
questions accordingly. I believe the reason why many researchers, including myself, twist and 
turn the subject after arriving to the country has much to do with the broader picture of the 
society and its issues made apparent. This is far from saying that one will understand the 
whole context as correct, but a better understanding is more likely. What direct experience 
adds on a personal level is the motivation to involve oneself further, to sit down to learn more. 
Hope, discussing the importance of direct experience, argues that though it is not certain for 
all, many establish a connection during fieldwork that spurs us to give our full attention. As 
                                                          
58
 Jarvie (1967), ”On Theories of Fieldwork and the Scientific Character of Social Anthropology” 
21 
 
Hope says, we care more for those we have encountered directly
59
. We have to acknowledge 
that our backgrounds will make us see things from another perspective than the people from 
the community that we meet. To believe one understands the context fully would be a naive 
and dangerous assumption, but fieldwork can give a “we-feeling” that can make the 
researcher stay objective and more motivated. My time in the field helped me to see my 
boundaries when it came to how research could be conducted in this specific setting, while 
talking to people challenged me to rethink and become aware of the issues the people in 
question were facing. Hope also argues that deep learning increases the critical thinking when 
motivation comes from within, as the researcher will be able to connect theory with direct 
experience. 
Much of what motivated me were the passionate and interesting people I met in Zambia. I 
want to point out that me being a foreigner, as well as a woman, may have affected the way I 
was approached, but the interest and kindness I was met with surprised me. It was through 
friendly new interactions that my snowballing for more contacts became possible.   
4.2 Methods 
My primary data comes from interviews with stakeholders like the PDLA and Chiefs, as well 
as the farmers from two out of three model villages in Petauke District, which should not be 
seen as representative for the district. Initially, I wanted to visit a randomly sampled village 
for representative reasons, but discovered after meeting with the PDLA that the certificates 
were only fully implemented in three villages, with the rest of them spread out. The chiefs’ 
approval of the certificates is essential for the spread of them, therefore, I was unable to pick 
any random village within the district, but had to limit myself to where the certificates had 
been implemented in order to see how they work. The model villages are special, in the sense 
that it is where the PDLA (in agreement with the respective chiefs) have done a pilot test with 
the implementation of the certificates in whole villages, rather than a few individuals. The 
selection of the villages is unclear; one chief I spoke to argued that they were picked by the 
PDLA, while the PDLA stated that the chiefs singled them out, and submitted the names to 
them. We therefore have to discern a possible bias in the model villages, as they may be more 
approved by the chiefs, as well as the implementing actors. I do, however, argue that this is to 
my favour, as if the more approved farmers express concerns or critique - it can indicate that 
other, less favoured farmers in other villages could have similar or even more negative 
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perspectives on the matter. This issue will be returned to in the analysis chapter. The three 
model villages in Petauke District are the Sikankhomba and Nkhumba villages (under 
Paramount Chief Kalindawalo), and the Dani village (under Chief Nyamphande). I was given 
the names of Sikankhomba and Dani – which are the two villages in which my mixed 
methods research finally was carried out.  
The data collected from the farmers in these two villages were carried out in two steps; 
quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interviews. Because of reading difficulties, the 
quantitative questionnaires had to be held as structured face-to-face interviews, where gender 
and age of the respondents were of relatively equal numbers. The questionnaires were hence 
carried out by bringing one farmer individually to the table where my interpreter and I were 
located, and included questions regarding conflicts, economic status, gender, origin, age, lost 
land, sense of security to the land, knowledge about the certificate, ownership of the 
certificate, and improvements since the implementation (see appendix). Apart from the 
necessary information that was collected through these questions, they also facilitated the 
sampling of the farmers relevant to interview in a qualitative manner. Extra attention was 
drawn to farmers who expressed any concerns or critique towards the implementation of the 
certificate, people without access to them, and those without a strong sense of security on 
their land. These qualitative interviews were carried out in an unstructured manner, 
elaborating on details, and deeply adjusted depending on the response of the interviewees.   
4.3 The material 
As can be understood from the data used in the background section, this study is based on 
secondary sources in the form of articles and documents, as well as the primary source 
interviews collected in the field. One major source that has been used in order to explain how 
the certificates are supposed to work is the Customary Land Administration Guidelines 
document, which is created by the PDLA after the gathering of norms, and agreed upon by the 
chiefs in the district. It could be argued that this document is highly biased in favour of the 
certificates, both because they are working passionately to implement the certificates and 
because they are in need of funding to spread the idea further. However, as I am not using this 
document as a truth for how the system works, but rather as an ideal picture of how it is 
supposed to work from the perspectives of the creators, I find it valid to use. I base my 
research on work focusing on conflicts and struggles over resources. As perhaps obvious from 
my theoretical framework, chapter 3, much is influenced by the works of Mahmood Mamdani 
23 
 
and Pauline Peters, and my agreements with their core arguments need to be emphasised as an 
obvious bias in my paper. The ways I try to find errors in the system, as well as the way I 
analyse my data, are influenced by the aforementioned theories.  
4.4 The interviews 
First I would like to emphasise that the informal observations, discussions, and interviews 
with the town people, youths, translators, church people and councillors have not been 
actively used in this paper, but helped me understand the context better. Being aware that 
many of the contacts I made are part of the elite or the actual creators of the certificates, my 
production of knowledge, which has affected the way my research was conducted, may be 
biased. However, together with others, they provided me with context information regarding 
conflicts, bewitching, jealousy of more successful farmers, the need for security, and the fear 
of headmen and chiefs. The pilot testing of the questionnaire in the Chongwe District did, 
apart from fill its purpose of ensuring well-functioning questions in order to reduce error, 
also increase my understanding of the situation for farmers outside of the model villages
60
. 
As Chongwe is located not far from Lusaka, the sense of an increased value of land was 
apparent. The three farmers interviewed passionately expressed their need for secure land, 
and described obstacles with the chief and headmen in order to receive their security. These 
unofficial interviews were interpreted in the moment and scribbled down as notes.  
 
The questionnaires and interviews with farmers were carried out in Sikankhomba village 
and Dani village the 27
th
 and 28
th
 of February. The long and slow process of arranging 
meetings according to the customs of the Zambian rural areas, as well as the time it takes to 
reach the villages (rain season and bad roads), makes the villages hard to access. Thanks to 
the councillor in Petauke, my formal meetings could eventually be arranged, allowing me to 
visit Chief Nyamphande in his palace for an interview and presentation of myself, to gain 
permission to enter Dani village. It should be noted that according to customary traditions, 
the one visiting the chief is required to pay royalties. Unfortunately, Chief Kalindawalo was 
unavailable, but the Councillor took me to Sikankhomba village anyway in order for me to 
arrange the research day with the headman of the village. As he happened to be out in his 
field far from the village when we arrived, we spoke to one of the elderly women about my 
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future visit. This was necessary, in order for the word to be spread so that as many as 
possible could attend when the day arrived.    
My Zambian researcher recommended me to skip the in-depth interviews because of the 
difficulties of accessing the villages, and emphasised focus groups instead. Holding focus 
groups does, however, in my context contain a number of shortcuts; Firstly, men and women 
would have to be separated, creating two different groups. The reason for this is because the 
presence of husbands or male relatives can have an impact on what the women say out loud. 
In my case, however, access to land, security, and concerns are sensitive subjects that the 
farmers within the community most likely would not openly talk about. The presence of the 
headman, aka the land administrator, could affect the answers in a focus group tremendously. 
One-on-one interviews consequently came out as the only way forward, and as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, illiteracy contributed to the fact that they had to be face-to-face, rather 
than in the form of self-completing questionnaires.  
As the majority of people in the villages of Petauke District speak Nsenga as their main 
language, I hired a translator and interpreter to carry out the semi-quantitative interviews. 
Kapborg and Berterö discuss how the use of an interpreter in qualitative interviews can 
threaten validity
61
. My translator was an experienced teacher from Petauke, with patience and 
understanding of the situation present in the District. Prior to the days when we visited the 
villages, we met up to discuss what the aim of the study was, and to go through all the 
questions and their meaning. While my research assistant conducted the interviews, I noted 
down body language and facial expressions to understand the interview situation better. The 
interviews were not translated word by word, but instead interpreted by my assistant and 
translated back to me. The fact that only notes and no recordings were taken is a weak point 
with my translation process, which has to be clearly emphasised, but limited resources made it 
hard to transcribe that amount of interviews. However, because my interpreter was well 
informed of my research aim and also could explain things to me that I would not have been 
able to understand from the exact wording given, some sentences would have meant little to 
me unless I had received the explanation of the actual meaning. The analyses of the 
interviews with the farmers were therefore different from the other interviews, and reflect 
both my translators’ interpretations and my own.  
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In total, 67 farmers from the two villages were interviewed through the questionnaires; 31 
men and 35 women, ranging between the ages of 17 and 87. These 67 farmers made up the 
maximum number I was able to interview in both villages with my limited time. Out of these, 
31 provided me with further qualitative information, of which 14 included relevant 
information for the research questions in this thesis. In both villages, the farmers were 
summoned to a familiar place where they remained all day, and one by one came to my table. 
Although I stated that I would like to talk to people in different age groups, the same amount 
of women as men, and with or without certificates, it must be emphasised that a cultural 
hierarchy in the villages may exist, that I as a visitor cannot control. Therefore, the people I 
got an opportunity to speak to may have been biased towards the elite, or may have been in 
favour of the certificate. Another factor that may have created a bias was the presence of 
myself and other people during the interviews, which could have affected the answers given. 
This was especially present in the Sikankhomba village, where the interviews were held 
within hearing distance from where the waiting respondents were located. Not being familiar 
with the existing relationships in the village, I cannot say in what way the presence of one 
person can affect the answers given by another. In Dani village, we were much more 
separated from the others, though the presence of my translator and I cannot be overlooked. 
My presence as a western outsider there to interview them regarding the TLHC has a high 
probability to have had an impact on the respondents’ replies. Where they believe their replies 
will end up, or their assumptions on what my aim is with the research, may have influenced 
them to be more positive about the certificates. The fact that I brought lunch to the attending 
farmers may also have influenced them to reply what they thought I wanted to hear. Another 
potential risk that may have affected the replies of some of the farmers was the fact that they 
likely believed I was associated with the PDLA and their agenda, or perhaps had the influence 
to affect the implementation, and possibly withdraw or increase the potential of the 
certificates. Note has to be taken that I was transparent in telling them that the interviews were 
voluntary and anonymous, as well as that I was a student and not linked to any government or 
organisation
62
. Still, I would highlight the potential motives of the farmers’ replies, and take 
their credibility with a pinch of salt. Another point that has to be made is that the farmers I 
interviewed were sampled from the ones that attended the whole-day meeting. With the lack 
of food during the time I was there, I was told by the headman in Sikankhomba village that 
some farmers could not attend because their fields were too far away and they needed to 
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cultivate. With that said – not all farmers were equally available, and there is a risk that some 
of the most marginalised are the ones that could not attend
63
. I will return to this issue later.   
Apart from participant observation and interviews with small-scale farmers, this field study is 
equally based on semi-structured and open-ended interviews with 8 key-informants of which 
6 have been used in this study; Chiefs, Pastors, Farmers Associations and above all; Petauke 
District Land Alliance. I made two attempts to get an interview with the Ministry of Lands to 
get a deeper understanding of the role of the government in making the certificates a part of 
customary law, but unfortunately that aspect will have to wait. I also attended a Chief 
workshop arranged by PDLA where four out of six chiefs attended together with indunas (the 
chiefs’ advisors), some headmen, the commissioner of lands and the government secretary. 
Though most conversation occurred in Nsenga, a lot of the dialogue was translated for me. I 
also want to highlight my own presence and the way I was presented again, which may have 
had an impact on the parts that were being translated.   
4.5 Structure of Analysis 
I have used SPSS in order to analyse and see patterns based on representativeness among the 
answers given by the farmers that were interviewed. When it comes to the quantitative data 
analysis, the questions in the questionnaire were designed in advance to facilitate the 
analysis in SPSS, with circling of the answers making it easy to codify into numbers. Many 
questions were in the form of dichotomies, with either/or replies. Apart from that, some 
questions called for real numbers when replied, others were interval variables, and some 
were nominal/categorical. When it comes to the transcribing of the recorded interviews, it 
has to be acknowledged that the information I selected was important enough to note, and 
also reflected my underlying assumptions
64
. In the case of the chief workshop, a lot of visual 
data was noted down to portray the potential power play taking place between the 
participants in the room. Much was being said in a mix between English and the local 
language Nsenga (recorded and transcribed simply as “Nsenga”), and I later returned to the 
Petauke District Land Alliance in order to get parts of the whole-day workshop explained to 
me, in the cases where Nsenga was spoken. 
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The stakeholder interviews were recorded and later transcribed into a word document in 
order to be analysed and coded using tools of grounded theory (see appendix). This was 
done through open coding of the interviews, where I broke down the transcripts into three 
categories; access to the certificates, security of the land with the certificates, and the role of 
the chiefs. After that, connections between the categories were done by linking them to the 
bigger context of power structures on customary land, through axial coding
65
. The 
recordings were carefully listened through more than once during transcribing, so as not to 
miss any important meanings or detail. Problems with the audio recording device hindered 
two of the interviews, and so had to be analysed from the notes taken at the time, where 
there is a risk of misinterpretation and memory shortage. Neither of the interviews were, 
however, relevant for my analysis, but provided me with a better understanding of the 
context in which this research was carried out.  
 
I would like to emphasise that the information in next chapter derives from the 67 
quantitative interviews with small-scale farmers in the Dani and Sikankhomba villages, as 
well as the 23 qualitative interviews with farmers, the PDLA, organisations and chiefs that 
all represent different actors on customary land. Based on my theories, the farmers are 
subjects representing a subordinate group to their chief, themselves representing different 
social groups based on gender, age, origin and class. The PDLA both represent civil society 
and the creators of the certificates, with their aim to implement them in the whole district 
and beyond. The recognition of these actors as representatives in a power structure on 
customary land is essential.  
 
5. Analysis 
As previously mentioned, the unequal access to secure land between social groups has been 
acknowledged by global institutions, chiefs, NGOs and farmers alike. Women, young people, 
strangers, and the poor are generally more marginalised and vulnerable than men, older 
people, village natives, and the wealthy. The recognition of specific social groups in need of 
empowerment has created a whole pro-poor global reform agenda, which the Petauke District 
Land Alliance (PDLA) strongly kept in mind in their aim to decrease conflicts that often 
disadvantage the vulnerable groups. This chapter will look at the farmers’ access to obtain the 
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Traditional Landholding Certificates (TLHC), the security to the land, and the role of the 
chiefs. 
5.1 Access to the Traditional Landholding Certificates   
“[W]e wanted it to be as fast as possible, as affordable for everybody in the village” 
 Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10
th
 of February 
First, it is to be noted that in order for the implementation of the TLHC to be successful in 
equal terms, it requires all farmers to have certificates that cover their lands. As the title deed 
is expensive and not easily accessible to obtain, the PDLA created the certificates to provide a 
cheaper and more easily accessible alternative that could give security for the poor. Hence, 
when it came to the model villages, after numerous meetings to increase the farmers’ 
knowledge about the certificates, all households that were present at the final meeting 
received certificates, whereas the farmers who were in Lusaka or somewhere else at the time 
did not. PDLA argue that the main benefit with owning a certificate is that no one from the 
family can remove you from your piece of family land without the consent of the headman 
and chief. As mentioned in chapter 2, approximately 99% of the customary land that is used 
for cultivating is family land. New pieces to cultivate are given out of the family land by the 
family head, to members of the family who are getting married while staying on the land. 
However, the new household still does not own that piece, but has rather been given it to 
cultivate. According to the PDLA, age matters when it comes to the actual owning of family 
land. Andrew Kamanga at the PDLA explains; 
“I did a small survey to check what age group has the own land and you find out that the 
person who has his own land now are those guys between the ages of 60 and upwards. All 
of those who are below 60- Or in the range of 60 - They don’t have their own land – all is 
family land. Now. If it is family land you have to get consent from family to say I want to 
rent this, or sell this piece of land. Or I want to use it with my husband. Because when you 
are there – for example if your husband comes into a field, the family must find the field 
that you must be using, and say this is the family field. For you to allow your husband to 
have a share in the ownership, you have to go back to the family” 66. 
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The farmers who have obtained certificates, and their dependents written on it, can therefore 
not be removed from the land by family members who claim the land belongs to them. But at 
the same time – it is not possible to obtain a certificate on family land unless the family has 
agreed to say that the applicant is allowed to apply for one. This enables them to limit access 
for relatives and their dependants in the first place. According to my SPSS analysis (see 
appendix), a number of farmers interviewed did not have certificates in their own names, but 
instead cultivated pieces of family land where the certificate was written in the name of a 
family member instead. Others had been successful in obtaining a certificate on their pieces of 
family land after consent was given from the family. 
Of the farmers who claimed the certificates are their own, younger as well as older, men as 
well as women, villagers as well as strangers, and wealthier as well as poorer all expressed 
their gratitude. Note that, as written in the previous chapter, their replies may have been 
affected by their beliefs of my intentions, or a possible link to the PDLA. The majority of men 
spoken to were heads of households, representing a less vulnerable social group in the 
villages, and owned certificates, whereas nearly half of the women spoken to did not. Though 
this can be interpreted as men being favoured the granting of certificates over women, I would 
rather argue that the heads of households are the ones with a bigger advantage, which in most 
cases - but not all – the heads were male. One particularly interesting case arose when a man I 
interviewed told me that his wife had a certificate on the land, and he did not. He had lived in 
the village for five years, and was of another ethnicity compared to the native villagers in the 
Petauke District. However, so were his wife and children, and although he was the headman, 
she was the owner of the certificate
67
. Consequently, according to the collected data, the 
access to the certificates can be perceived as equal in the model villages, with representatives 
from all social groups holding them.  
I also spoke to many farmers who did not own certificates in their names. Most of them were 
cultivating pieces of family land where other members of the family had a certificate that 
covered their piece. This was also true for some heads of households
68
. One head of 
household lost his land after plans to build a boarding school were granted, and was rejected a 
certificate on his land after applying one year ago
69
. Two other farmers were refused 
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certificates because they lacked the compulsory passport photos in their applications
70
. 
Though the PDLA argues that almost no one who has applied for a certificate has been 
refused, the application process is not as simple as it may sound. The difficulty for poorer 
farmers to obtain passport photographs in the remote villages may ultimately prevent them 
from successfully applying for a certificate. One man, 34 years old, head of a household, 
native in the village and with an above average output of maize – hence not belonging to any 
of the vulnerable social groups mentioned earlier – also complained about the application 
form requiring a knowledge of English. As he only spoke Nsenga, he said he felt it unfair that 
only English-speaking people can apply
71
. When it comes to the local language, however, the 
PDLA claim that the issue is whether the farmers could read it or not once translated – so only 
few people would benefit from it, while the cost of translating would be high
72
. Some farmers, 
such as the last one mentioned, did not know how to apply. One was in fact the senior 
headman, who had only heard about the certificates but never seen any, and claimed he would 
try to save up the money to obtain a certificate but could not do it right now because last year 
he was sick, and so the harvest was poor
73
. Surprisingly, the headmen of the villages that I 
interviewed – representing the elite with their power to allocate land in the village – neither 
appeared wealthier than others, nor favoured, when it came to the access of the certificates. 
Another example of a person who did not know how to apply for a certificate was a young 
woman of 26, whose mother, being the head of the household, had a certificate covering the 
acres of land that the interviewee considered her own. She wanted her own certificate that 
covered her acres instead
74
. This brings us to the continued power of family heads on family 
land and the perception of security. 
The PDLA estimates that most certificates, 3-4000 of them, are spread within the urban 
areas
75
. The distance to town and access to information may play a big role, but should not 
undermine the nature and willingness of the chiefs, who make a difference in whether the 
subjects in the chiefdom get the possibility to apply for a certificate or not. If the chief, as the 
highest authority on customary land, does not accept the implementation of the certificates, no 
certificates will be signed and hence the farmers in that chiefdom will not have any 
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opportunity to obtain them. If rounded up, the number of certificates issued in the model 
villages reaches approximately 300 out of the 4000+ certificates issued in Petauke District. 
The PDLA argue that the model villages are the only villages where the certificates have been 
implemented in practically every household, and that the rest of them, meaning at least more 
than 3500, are spread out to individuals rather than villages
76
. 
One big concern that stood out in two of the interviews, with one female and one male farmer 
from Dani village, was the fact that only the farmers in the model villages had received 
certificates for free, while the rest would have to pay to obtain them.  
“[B]ecause they are a model village, the people that got certificates were lucky. But not 
everyone in the village has a certificate, and that is a problem. Only 60 people have 
certificates. Of the people that are left – they will have to pay!”  
 Woman, 43 years, TLHC committee member
77
  
One farmer, a woman of 51 years, explained the selection of farmers that would obtain 
certificates in the model village was made during a village meeting that the PDLA held one 
year ago, where everyone at the meeting wrote their names down on a list, and later obtained 
the certificates. The ones who could not come to that meeting were left behind
78
. 
“We in the model villages did not have to pay anything. The chief wanted 150 kwacha but 
we talked to him and said NO. However, it now will cost 200 kwacha for residential area 
and 150 kwacha for fields for everyone else. And all that money goes to the chiefs. Poor 
people can’t afford that. Why do they need that much? The people aren’t buying the land! 
It still belongs to the chief and he can take it back! I wish we could pay in kind instead of a 
fee. Just if you want to go and speak to the chief you need to bring a goat.”  
 Man, 43 years, TLHC committee member
79
 
As mentioned in the background section, the agreed price of farmland below 5 hectares is 50 
kwacha, equivalent to a little more than 7 USD. The authority of the chiefs, and lack of 
enforcement of the agreements with the PDLA does, however, give the chiefs complete 
control. The fact that the PDLA argues that some chiefs even charge 250 kwacha (~36 
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USD)
80
 for farmland makes the matter worse, as it indicates that the prices the chiefs decide to 
charge may vary, between the different individual chiefs and also on the their relationships to 
the applicants. This issue will be returned to later in this analysis. 
I would argue that as the collected data of how the TLHC works in the model villages can 
indicate how it could work in other villages.  The fact that not everyone in the model villages 
were aware of how to apply for the certificates also indicates that farmers in other villages, 
without information meetings given numerous times by PDLA, may have a low access to the 
information needed to apply. Access may more easily reach the political and economic elite, 
who are more likely to be able to afford to invest more time on meetings and networking than 
marginalised farmers. As an example, I wish to bring up an interview with the chairperson of 
the Petauke District Farmers’ Association, who, after the chief workshop, suggested it would 
be a good idea for the information about the TLHC to be spread throughout their organisation. 
Though the spreading to the members of the organisation could be done through village 
meetings and also through a trickledown effect of the knowledge, the first hand access would 
reach the members, who pay a fee of 100 kwacha (last year’s fee), and with access to loans, 
would represent a less vulnerable class of farmers
81
.  
Though my SPSS data of the model villages showed unequal access to the knowledge of how 
to apply for the certificates, it has to be acknowledged that it was on random terms. No 
indicators of biases towards the more favoured social groups of men, elders, villagers and 
wealthier people could be found in the access to applying within the village. Access to the 
knowledge about the certificate is, however, not the same as the access to obtaining them, 
which is highly linked to whether the implementation is successful or not. As argued in 
chapter 2, increasing conflicts are revealing social differentiation on customary land, which is 
of the highest importance for the new system of the TLHC to decrease. My data showed that 
within the model villages, unfavoured social groups like women, youngsters and strangers had 
been successful in obtaining the certificates, which indicated a non-significant bias in the 
implementation of the TLHC, and the access the farmers had to obtaining them. However, it 
should still be noted that not everyone could attend the PDLA meeting where the names were 
collected, and that there is a risk that the worst off may have been out in their fields during the 
time the certificates were issued, just as they were during my interviews.  
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More importantly, the power structure situated on family land remains, and can control the 
access of farmers in obtaining a certificate. The social groups of older people, men, and native 
villagers still remain more powerful than their opposites, especially as they are more common 
as family heads with control over the access to family land. Unless the head of the family 
accepts parts of the family land to end up in - for example - the hands of a relative’s spouse, 
the head will not accept a certificate to that relative and his/her spouse. If a certificate is 
granted, the land will pass on to the relative’s spouse and children as an inheritance, without 
the family being able to reclaim it, unless with consent from both the headman and the chief. 
Social groups in inheritance disputes like women, children, and strangers, can remain 
unfavoured – and continue the social differentiation even after the implementation of the 
TLHC.   
5.2 Security to the land  
 “Before I lost land because I didn’t have certificate, but now I won’t. Both me and my 
family will be secure even when I die. First my wife will take over then my children” 
 Man, 58 yrs, Sikankhomba village
82
  
As mentioned in chapter 1, the PDLA was formed in 2007, after a survey was compiled by 
the Zambia Land Alliance to find out which districts were most prone to conflicts
83
. The idea 
of the certificates then came out of the PDLA’s wish to decrease the conflicts in Petauke, and 
increase the security for the farmers who had been vulnerable after losing their land in the 
disputes. According to Chief Nyamphande, conflicts initially increased when villagers that 
had migrated to urban areas heard about the implementation, and came back to claim 
ownership to the land
84
. Since the rightful owners were established and the TLHC was 
implemented, the conflicts over land in the model villages have, according to the PDLA, been 
reduced, while also empowering women and the young, who will no longer be displaced in 
the case of death of the breadwinner
85
.  
According to my SPSS data (see appendix), the perception of decreased conflicts since the 
implementation of the TLHC in both Dani and Sikankhomba village are high among farmers 
who have obtained the certificates, as well as the ones who have not. Relatively equal 
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amounts of men and women, both people from the village and strangers, both old and young, 
and those with different economic situations felt that the disputes had decreased. A few 
farmers argued that they did not see a decrease in disputes in the village from previous years, 
but had only heard about them happening - something they had not encountered themselves. 
Those farmers were, however, also mixed in gender, age, origin and income; hence owning a 
certificate does not seem to matter in the perception of conflicts. When it comes to security, it 
has to be acknowledged that though almost everyone I spoke to felt that the land they were 
cultivating would be secure to their children after the breadwinner’s death. I wish to 
emphasise that many – but not everyone - mentioned the certificates as a cause for that type of 
security, with some stating the reason for this security lays in the fact that the land would 
belong to the children. As previously mentioned, note should be taken that their replies may 
be affected by perceptions that I could be linked to PDLA. My SPSS data showed that 
farmers with certificates in their own names, as well as farmers with certificates in a family 
member’s name (and also one farmer who did not know how to apply), felt more secure since 
they had obtained the certificate about a year ago. None of the farmers that felt less secure 
owned a certificate in their name, but had land belonging to a family member with certificate, 
had been refused one, or did not know how to apply. Once again, these farmers belonged to 
different social groups, and hence, the access to the certificate cannot be viewed as unequal 
based on my SPSS data collected through quantitative questionnaires. However, concerns 
were expressed related to security by some farmers without certificates in their own names;  
“I do not feel that the land is safe for me and my children due to the different views people 
have. My husband has the certificate and there is a risk that his family members come to 
get this land if he would die. I do not feel secure”  
 Woman, 25 years, with a husband owning a certificate
86
 
“My land belongs to my parents and I need their permission to cultivate it. If I die my 
parents can take back the land, so it is not safe for my wife and children. I’m hoping to 
soon ask for more land from the headman for my wife and children”  
 Man, 35 years, with a wife from another village
87
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The latter quote indicates that the man’s parents – though allowing him to cultivate land as if 
it was his own – do not permit him to get a certificate in which his wife and children’s names 
would be written as dependants, and be the ones to inherit the certificate and land in case he 
would die. The lack of security that these two individuals express is highly linked to the 
remaining power structure on family lands, as discussed in the previous sub-chapter.  
The power structure on family land is not the only concern that the qualitative interviews with 
the farmers pointed out, but also the power of the chiefs. One especially insecure interviewee 
I spoke to had lost his land to the chief recently.  
“I lost land in the building of a boarding school. Now I only have 2,5 acres and I need 
permission from the chief. My land was in the area where they wanted to build the school, 
so I was told I could continue to cultivate it only until 2014. I have been promised new 
land from the chief. My land was 10 acres. I feel really insecure! There is nothing I can do! 
I’m actually really upset and wanted to move from this village but the headman told me to 
wait and see what the chief says. But up until now I am still waiting” 88. 
The other farmers’ perception of security may come from a misconception of what the TLHC 
really is. Though the PDLA claim they visited the village a number of times to increase the 
farmers’ knowledge about the certificates, I personally perceived people confusing the TLHC 
with title deeds. There is a lack of knowledge of what TLHC actually stands for, and the 
PDLA have highlighted that many farmers believe they have got full protection with the 
certificates, and that neither the headman nor the chief can push them out
89
. No farmers that 
were interviewed indicated any knowledge of the chief being the actual owner of the 
certificates they were holding - information that was clearly stated by the PDLA during the 
chief workshop. The fact that the chief signs the certificates gives security in the case of 
disputes over ownership, and gives people a sense of security that they are fully protected 
with the certificates.  
The whole village benefitting when the majority of households have certificates can be seen 
with fewer disputes, more clearly established boundaries, and a higher perception of security 
on the land. The inequality linked to social groups that have been more vulnerable when it 
comes to obtaining access to secure land is reduced through the certificates, as e.g. women, 
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children and strangers – if not already having a certificate written in their name - often are 
written as dependants that take over the land. The positive effect with the certificates is that, 
apart from being safer on family land, the headman or chief cannot remove the farmer who 
has obtained the certificate unless he/she breaks any of the conditions that were established 
when issued. The fact that the certificates come with conditions highlights the possibility for 
the chief to remove people without certificates more easily, which could indicate a future risk 
for those worse off, when others have certificates. Once again, we must look beyond the 
model villages, and link this to the previous sub-chapter of the access to certificates that in the 
model villages might have been insignificantly biased, but outside the model villages may 
appear different. As established above, there are indicators that reveal both access to 
knowledge of, and access to obtaining the certificates would be harder in other villages – and 
where the wealthier would potentially have better access. If that would be the case, then 
security could be limited to the households that know of, and can afford the certificates. 
Women, youngsters, and stranger spouses belonging to that specific household would then 
benefit, whereas the households unable to obtain that security would not. In those households, 
the equivalent vulnerable social groups would continue to be the most disadvantaged. 
5.3 The Power of the Chiefs 
The fact that the perception of security has increased, while conflicts have decreased within 
the model villages, could be understood as encouraging reasons for the chiefs to accept the 
certificates. However, as mentioned previously, only four out of six chiefs in Petauke District 
have started to distribute them
90
.  
Some chiefs in the district fear the certificates and believe that they resemble title deeds which 
will make them lose power, and hence are unwilling to cooperate with the PDLA in the 
implementation. Though not yet with same authority as title deeds, for example electricity 
companies is using TLHC as a source of proof of entitlement to the land given by the chief. 
The same chief that does not want to cooperate with the PDLA in the implementation has, 
however, gone to the extent to falsify the documents in order to bring in electricity
91
. In the 
PDLA’s attempts to emphasise the benefits of implementing the TLHC, they also focus on the 
fact that the chiefs benefit from less disputes in their chiefdoms, as it will be calmer and will 
allow them more control. In many cases, the indunas have advised against the certificates. An 
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example of this, according to the PDLA, is when it led to one chief never implementing the 
TLHC in a model village in which he had claimed he would – but instead continued to 
maintain he was going to do so and never did. With a lack of transparency, and no one to 
enforce the chiefs to follow what has been agreed upon, they can do as they wish when it 
comes to the TLHC. Chiefs have also argued that they cannot implement the TLHC, as they 
do not know the actual household numbers or fields
92
. Apart from the reduction in disputes, 
the PDLA also emphasise that the TLHC is an alternative to title deeds in which farmers will 
have security, while chiefs continue to have the same powers and control. During the chief 
workshop in which four out of six chiefs in the Petauke District were gathered, the PDLA 
assured that they aimed to keep the powers of the chief through the implementation of the 
TLHC. On customary land, they argue, people have started to lose respect for the chiefs, as 
the chiefs’ indunas are increasingly taking power and misusing it. The administration of the 
only asset – land - has gone to everybody else, instead of being kept with the chiefs and 
headmen who are the true land administrators
93
. In fact, the TLHC therefore puts the chiefs 
and headmen in focus, and increases their power. The headmen continue to have control over 
the usage of the land, but have no control in pushing people out without the consent from the 
chief. Andrew Kamanga from PDLA expresses it like this; 
“You know the thing is that the chiefs’ still has the control. The headperson still has the 
control. But the headperson only has control over the usage of this land but no control to 
say this is my land right get out of here without having consent from the chief. So that this 
time, for example, if I died, the headman despite having the authority or my family having 
the authority, they cannot tell anyone to inherit it until the chief also consent to say yes, 
this person can inherit” 94.    
The struggle for power at the top between chiefs, indunas, and headmen has led to the idea of 
a Land Allocation Board (LAB) to be implemented together with the issuance of certificates. 
Consisting of representatives from different stakeholders on customary land, the LAB aims to 
return the power to the chiefs and headmen, the authorities with rights to allocate land, rather 
than the indunas who only are advisors to the chiefs. Concerns have been expressed that 
gathering representatives from the ministry would be difficult without offering sitting 
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allowances
95
. However, similar concerns have also been expressed by the PDLA regarding 
meetings with the chiefs to discuss the TLHC, arguing that they demand sitting allowances, 
transport, and in some cases even overnight stays in order to attend. The PDLA argue that 
problems derive from the declaration that all land has value in spite of the vast abundance; 
“[Y]ou see the government has been I think for the last 20 years when we just came up 
with multipartism, the government was the direction. The direction in the sense that they 
declared that any traditional land all land is now marketed; all land has value, all land. 
Remove that barrier. Suddenly chiefs started to get allowances. Political games. And when 
chiefs started to get allowances, problems came up on the successions... So we have all 
these struggles. Now they can give them loans and grants you know. Just to make them 
more powerful...” 96. 
And these demands from the chiefs have to be put within the context of a new system that is 
supposed to benefit their subjects. Clearly – the benefits of the subjects are not always highest 
on the chiefs’ agenda. For example, a major benefit with the title deeds is that the official 
documents make banks accept the land as collateral, when farmers want to take out a loan in 
order to develop their farms. As security alone is not enough to increase productivity, the 
PDLA is in the process of also making the banks accept the TLHC as collateral
97
. If a farmer 
with a certificate wants to apply for a loan at the bank, he will first have to receive consent 
from the chief, who is the actual holder of the land. If the farmer then cannot repay that loan, 
the bank will have the authority to sell it
98
. As title deeds take authority from the chiefs, the 
land being converted to leasehold tenure would make the chiefs lose power over it, which 
makes it important for them to keep the customary system intact. If this is the case, then the 
possibility of the farmers receiving consent from the chief to use the certificates as collateral 
seems very low.     
The chiefs’ fear of losing power also puts the PDLA in a difficult position as the implementer 
of the TLHC. Different civil society organisations may have ideas of how a reform can 
benefit the poor, but without the chiefs benefitting from it – it would be unlikely for anything 
to happen, as the chiefs do not want to lose power. This claim is made based on indicators of 
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the struggles the PDLA face with not being able to enforce the chiefs to stick to the 
agreements made, between the PDLA and the six chiefs in the district. If the chiefs can 
misuse their power on customary land, they can also use the implementation of the certificates 
to their own advantage. The PDLA is torn in between; wanting the farmers to benefit as much 
as possible, while having to adapt to the chiefs’ will as the system of the TLHC can only work 
with the agreement of the chiefs.  Attracting their interest therefore becomes a high priority.  
It should be noted that the PDLA aim for the certificates to be produced and distributed by the 
chiefs, instead of by themselves, as it is unsustainable for them to do it in the long run. At the 
present moment, the chiefs lack the technology to be able to produce and distribute it on their 
own. The three model villages succeeded in getting their certificates for free, as they function 
as a pilot test for the PDLA in the implementation of the certificates. According to the PDLA, 
they were also doing village governance in the model villages; turning a blind eye and letting 
the villagers fight on their own to obtain certificates – just as others will have to do outside of 
the model villages. An important point to notice is the fact that the model villages were 
selected by either the chief or the PDLA, with both parties claiming that the other made the 
selection
99
. The proneness of the chiefs to try model villages, as well as the fact that the 
PDLA themselves stated that they did not want a village headman or people that were not on 
good terms with the chiefs in the model villages (as the implementation would then fail), 
indicates that the farmers outside the model villages could be in an even more complicated 
situation than the favoured farmers inside them.     
Though the PDLA distribute the certificates for free for the chiefs to hand out, some chiefs, in 
order to overcharge, have told their subjects that the PDLA charge for the certificates. The 
interviews showed that farmers applying for certificates need to pay a price higher than 
agreed by the PDLA. Instead of reflecting the production and time costs, the price of the 
certificate is looking similar to a source of income. The PDLA put it in clear writing; 
“Chiefs will capitalise on that. Make money out of it, and my question is, where does that 
money go? Not back to the farmers!” 100  
The self interest of the chief – a political and economic actor - does not always walk hand in 
hand with the benefit of the subjects.   
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If, then, disputes are decreased resulting in more order within the chiefdom and less work for 
the chiefs, the question arises of why they do not keep the agreed lower price of the 
certificates, so that more farmers can afford to obtain them; or in fact – why all chiefs do not 
decide to implement them in the first place. What first has to be understood, is that norms on 
customary land include the offering of royalties for anyone who wishes to visit or consult the 
chiefs. As it is now, the disputes generate an income for them, in which I have been told that 
the royalty needed to even speak with the chief is too high for some farmers to be able to 
afford, in order to raise their issues. The disputes over land force them to arrange 
consultations, generating an income for the chiefs. Thus, there is reluctance from the chiefs to 
willingly adapt to the new system if it includes a loss of one source of income, which is 
combined with the fear that they might lose power by doing so
101
. This is one of the reasons, 
that the PDLA argues, for why two of the chiefs do not want to implement the certificate. The 
PDLA states that the education of the chiefs matters, as less education makes the chiefs that 
are born into power ignorant of their true role of looking after the subjects in the chiefdom. 
The most ignorant chiefs, and the ones most in need of money would hence be the ones least 
prone to implement the certificates
102. The PDLA’s argument goes hand in hand with the fact 
that Chief Nyamphande and Chief Kalidawalo are the more educated and wealthy chiefs, and 
are also the ones who have agreed on the implementation. However, the interviews with 
farmers belonging to these chiefs, as well as the interviews with the PDLA proved that people 
without a certificate would have to pay a higher price than agreed upon between the chiefs 
and the PDLA. If that is the case, it indicates that the less wealthy or uneducated chiefs are 
likely to charge a higher price to the farmers if eventually deciding to implement the TLHC.  
 
This could indicate a risk of deepening social differentiation, based majorly on income. A 
segregation, in which some social groups can obtain the knowledge, access to, and afford to 
pay the price for increased security, while other social groups cannot. One could hence claim 
that the power of the chiefs, when misused, can deepen social differentiation further with the 
TLHC. Apart from the segregation that may arise within villages if some individuals are able 
to obtain certificates, whereas others, representing more vulnerable social groups like 
economically marginalised, are not – there may also arise segregation between chiefdoms if 
farmers belonging to one chief obtain higher security on their land than farmers from another 
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chiefdom. The heterogeneous farmers continue to be subjects under the chiefs – defined as 
members of the tribe rather than individuals – with the chiefs as their authority, shaping their 
access to security of the resources on which their livelihoods depend.   
  
6. Summary Conclusion 
In this study, I have presented indicators that show the existing power relations on customary 
land allow chiefs to benefit by the Traditional Landholding Certificates (TLHC) on behalf of 
the subjects, which in turn reflect the continued containerisation of small-scale farmers on 
customary land, and highlight potential social differentiation. These power relations have to 
be emphasised when it comes to the debate of whether decentralisation brings power closer to 
the grassroots, or if it does not. My research has been based on conflicts and struggles over 
resources from a political economy approach, more specifically influenced by the writings of 
Mahmood Mamdani and Pauline Peters. To relate the possible impact of existing power 
structures on new systems created by civil society in order to provide equal land rights on 
customary land, I spent nine weeks in Petauke District to get a better understanding of how 
the system works from an economic and political approach.  
The quantitative questionnaires not only showed that the perception of conflicts had decreased 
in the model villages I visited, but that an overall perception of increased security existed 
where the certificates had been implemented. The interviews with the farmers, as well as with 
the Petauke District Land Alliance (PDLA) did, however, indicate a risk of misconceptions 
among the farmers of what security the TLHC really offers. Chiefs remain the owners of the 
certificates, but with the authority to recall the issued certificate if any of the conditions are 
broken. The certificates naturally give inheritance to the remaining spouses and children, 
which especially empower women and young people – representing vulnerable social groups 
on customary land that before have been more prone to losing their land in conflicts. The fact 
that boundaries and inheritance both become more clearly established has a potential to 
reduce the conflicts over family land, which the farmers in the model villages expressed they 
could already feel only a year after the implementation of the TLHC. However, the power 
structure on family land is still intact, as the consent from the family is required before a 
relative can apply for a certificate on the land. Family heads, the majority being around 60 
years old or more, represent a more powerful group that can limit access to obtain a certificate 
for relatives and the security for their spouses, especially if deriving from other villages. 
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These spouses represent a vulnerable social group, just as women and young people on family 
land, which is why power is limited in the access to security. An even bigger issue arose 
regarding the price of the certificates, with concerns expressed by the farmers. The pilot tests 
in the form of model villages were successful in obtaining the certificates for free by the 
chiefs – but every farmer in the model villages who have not yet obtained the certificate, as 
well as the farmers in other villages, would be required to pay. The interviews with the 
farmers also showed that the chiefs charge a 3-5 times higher price than what was agreed 
upon between the PDLA and all the chiefs in the district. This relates back to the authority of 
the chiefs and the lack of enforcement for them to keep their agreements with civil society, 
which in turn brings us back to decentralisation and the power structure on customary land. 
The decentralisation policy’s aim to bring powers down to a local level, where chiefs’ 
participation in governance is considered a key for development to trickle down to a 
grassroots level, must therefore be questioned and the complexity emphasised. The system the 
TLHC is aiming to implement is a Land Administration Board that will return powers from 
the indunas, without the traditional right to the power, to the chiefs and headmen. The fact 
that the indunas’ often corruptive behaviour will be reduced does not, however, eliminate the 
risk of the chiefs misbehaving in a similar fashion. 
That the seemingly most wealthy and educated chief in the district is overcharging for the 
certificates indicates the possibility that other chiefs, less prone to implement the certificates, 
could do the same or even more. As the TLHC reduces conflicts that serve as a source of 
income for the chiefs, it is likely that that loss of income would be substituted by generating a 
new income through the issuance of the certificates. However, that puts the chief as an 
economic and political actor with the authority to indirectly exclude subjects from obtaining 
security through the certificates. If you can afford to pay, you gain security, whereas you do 
not if you do not have the access to obtaining them. When the access to obtaining the 
certificate becomes more difficult than the security, there is a potential risk of social 
differentiation worsening. The price charged by the chief presents a risk of segregation within 
villages, as some wealthier social groups would obtain increased security by affording to buy 
certificates that come with conditions, while the less fortunate might not be able to afford to 
pay the required cost, and without the certificates could be displaced more easily.  
The post-modern thinking that customary systems are negotiable and adaptive forms of 
landholding, and hence an open field of discussions between tribes, communities, civil 
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society, and national, regional and local groups, would lead to an equitable outcome that can 
hence be argued as idealistic. While certain social groups have limited or no negotiation 
power, the PDLA have to adapt to the chiefs interests in order for the implementation of the 
certificates to work. The Petauke District Land Alliance is stuck in between, with a goal for 
the certificates to benefit all small-scale farmers, but the system not reaching the farmers at all 
unless the chiefs agree on it. The need for the PDLA to attract the chiefs in order for the 
system to work creates problems and shifts the not-yet-fully-established system into a 
compromise between the chiefs and the PDLA. Even when arranged, nothing is enforcing the 
chiefs to hold on to that agreement, limiting the negotiation power of civil society. At the 
same time, the farmers continue to be containerised as a subordinate group under the chiefs, 
with no forum or power to negotiate their will unless the chief agrees and is available. Once 
again, the farmers are nowhere near a homogeneous group with same interests that the chief – 
even if wanting to - could represent equally on a district level.  
The World Bank and other global institutions are promoting the “New Evolutionary Property 
Rights” as a way of building equitable land rights on already existing systems. The National 
Decentralisation Policy of Zambia is growing by increasing the responsibility of local 
authorities and participation of governance by the chiefs, and putting the chiefs as keys to 
ensure development on a grassroots level. This paper calls for a closer look at broad processes 
of inequality and class formations in relation to power structures on customary land, that may 
inhibit development and security for certain social groups through limitations of access. If the 
implementation of the TLHC is to be successful, reduction of conflicts is not enough – it also 
has to benefit all social groups equally.  
However, I wish to highlight that the certificates are still being developed and improved, and 
much can occur until fully established. A bill proposed to parliament could change and adapt 
the certificates further. If the TLHC achieves the same authority as the title deed, which the 
PDLA is hoping for, the relationships between individual farmers and chiefs becomes even 
more important. The subjects’ relationship with the chief can affect the chief’s willingness to 
accept the certificate and land to be used as collateral, leading to possible development. A risk 
of increased social differentiation may occur if that security and access only benefits certain 
social groups, where conflicts may be reduced at the expense of the vulnerable. The farmers 
continue to be dependent on the authority of the chief under the TLHC, defined as members 
of a tribe belonging to a chief, rather than separate heterogeneous individuals of the nation. 
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th
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Farmer interview D03, Man, 67 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D08, Woman, 25 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D10, Woman, 83 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
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Farmer interview D14, Woman, 62 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D17, Man, 68 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D20, Woman, 35 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D23, Man, 44 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D25, Man, 35 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D30, Woman, 26 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D36, Woman, 43 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D37, Woman, 51 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Farmer interview D38, Man, 43 yrs, Dani village, 28
th
 of February 
Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10
th
 of February 
Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 12
th
 of February 
Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 25
th
 of February 
Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, Chief workshop 25
th
 of February, Petauke 
Andrew Kamanga, Petauke District Land Alliance, 13
th
 of March 
Chief Nyamphande, Petauke, 26
th
 of February  
Chief Macha, Choma, 31
st
 of January  
Commissioner of Lands, Chief workshop 25
th
 of February 2014, Petauke  
Joseph Lungu, Petauke District Farmers’ Association, Petauke, 25th of February 
Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, Chief workshop 25
th
 of February, Petauke 
Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 10
th
 of February 
Moses Phiri, Petauke District Land Alliance, 12
th
 of February 
Pastor Shamwanga, Petauke, 11
th
 of February 2014 
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Questionnaire: 
Date: _________________________ Village: ____________________________ 
Interview number: ______________ Name: _____________________________   
Q. no. Question Reply 
1 Sex           Male                             Female 
2 Are you a village headman?           Yes                                  No 
3 If not native of this area, where were you born?  
4 How many years have you lived here?  
5 What is your marital status? Currently married      Never married         
Separated       Divorced       Widowed 
6 Name of head of household  
7 Sex of head of household                 Male                         Female 
8 What age are you?  
9 What is your ethnic tribe?  
10 What ethnic tribe is your spouse?  
(if you have one) 
 
 
11 What ethnic tribe are your children?  
(if you have any) 
 
12 What is your total farm size in the village? Specify   
13 How much of this land is your own land? Specify   
14 How much of the land is cultivated? Specify  
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15 How much of the land is rented to others? Specify   
16 Do you have land outside the village?               Yes                          No 
17 Do you have full control of all the land you now 
cultivate or do you need to consult any other 
person in order to obtain permission for 
cultivation, change crops/land use, for some or all 
of your land?  
                      
                       Full control 
 
                    Need permission 
18 If market conditions improved, would you be able 
to put more land under cultivation to expand your 
farm?  
 
              Yes                         No 
19 Would you consider taking a loan in order to 
increase the productivity on the land if you had 
the possibility to? 
 
              Yes                         No 
20 Have you lost land that you considered that you 
had rights to cultivate?  
              Yes                        No 
21 Do you feel that your land is secure for you and 
your family at the present?  
              Yes                        No 
22 You know we are bound to die, what if tomorrow 
you are not there, do you feel that your land still 
will be secure for your family? 
 
              Yes                        No 
23 Why?  
24 Have you ever considered converting your land to 
leasehold land/title deed? 
              Yes                        No 
25 Have you seen this certificate before?  
Show. If no  - jump to question 32 
              Yes                        No  
26 Where did you see/hear about it?  
27 Do you own a certificate?               Yes                       No 
28 If no – why not? 
(after answer – jump to question 33) 
My spouse owns a certificate 
I was refused  
I have no interest  
I don’t know how to apply 
29 When did you apply?     >1 yr ago                 1 yr ago 
2 yrs ago    3 yrs ago        4 yrs ago 
30 Do you feel more secure on your land after 
obtaining the certificate? 
 
              Yes                         No 
31 Have you invested more in your land after 
obtaining the certificate? 
 
              Yes                         No 
32 If not seen certificate before: Would you be 
interested in obtaining one? 
 
              Yes                         No 
33 What was your total output of maize last year? 
Specify in bags of maize. 
 
34 How many bags of maize did you sell last year? 
Specify 
 
35 Do you have any other source of income?  
Specify. main source? 
 
36 Do you feel that it has been a lot of disputes over 
land in the village? 
 
37 Do you feel that they have changed during the last 
4 years? 
Yes, less       No, same       Yes, more  
38 Why?  
 
Do you have any comments? 
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Example of Coding: 
Quotations Open Coding Axial Coding Selective 
Coding 
All of those who are below 60- Or in the range of 60 - 
They don’t have their own land – all is family land. Now. 
If it is family land you have to get consent from family 
Need consent 
from family head 
 
Family power 
structure 
remaining 
 
 
 
 
 
Access  
And most of these, around 3-4000 they are just within the 
urban areas mostly 
most certificates 
spread within the 
urban areas 
Urban bias 
I’ve heard about the certificate but not seen it. I don’t 
know how to apply either or how much it costs. 
Do not know how 
to apply 
Issues with 
applying 
I was informed by the chairman of how to apply, but I 
don’t know how to do it because it is in English. If it was 
in Nsenga I would apply today! I feel that it is unfair that 
only some that speaks English can get it. 
Cannot apply 
because wrong 
language 
Because the TLHC itself is just a security to that land. 
Because sometimes, within that family land, one of the 
guys can bully you around saying can you move from this 
field and can you look for another field somewhere else? 
So the protection is that this person cannot remove you out 
without getting the consent of the headperson and the 
consent of the chief. 
family cannot 
remove without 
the consent of the 
headman and 
chief 
If obtained – 
safe from 
family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security 
one thing we must understand is that these guys are taking 
it for granted. Of saying that “as long as I get a certificate 
– I’m secure. Because no one is going to push me out” 
Misconception of 
what TLHC 
actually stands for 
Not secure from 
chief 
I do not feel that the land is safe for me and my children 
due to the different views people have. My husband has 
the certificate and there is a risk that his family members 
come to get this land if he would die. 
Husband’s family 
can still claim the 
land 
Farmers feeling 
insecure due to 
lack of 
certificate or 
name written as 
dependant 
My land belongs to my parents and I need their permission 
to cultivate it. If I die my parents can take back the land, 
so it is not safe for my wife and children. 
Parents can claim 
land back from 
his wife and 
children if he 
would die 
Those certificates should be free but you know what will 
happen? They will capitalise on that. And they will make 
a lot of money out of it and my question  is where does 
that money go? The amount of money they collect..!  It’s 
not going back to the farmers! 
Chiefs making 
money out of 
certificates. Not 
reaching farmers. 
Chiefs 
benefiting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chiefs 
However, it now will cost 200 kwacha for residential area 
and 150 kwacha for fields for everyone else. And all that 
money goes to the chiefs. Poor people can’t afford that. 
Price of 
certificates 
First of all they never believed it. They thought maybe just 
as you said that they are losing power, because the first 
thing that came into their mind is that these traditional 
landholding certificate was a title. First of all they didn’t 
actually understand what we meant. For them – it was a 
title. 
Some chiefs fear 
the certificates 
and believe that 
they are title 
deeds which will 
make them lose 
power. 
Chiefs not  
implementing 
And this is one thing that some indunas are telling the 
chiefs that “don’t give them. Because if you give them 
what will happen is that you won’t have these conflicts” 
because them – this is madness of thinking that – but as 
long as there are conflicts they survive better. 
Disputes generate 
an income for the 
chiefs 
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Example of Quantitative Data Analysis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
